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ANALYZING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SIXTH
AMENDMENTS IN HIGH-PROFILE CRIMINAL CASES
Within the United States, technology is ever emerging in daily life. Nearly all Americans
have access to the internet and smartphones, and one tweet can rival CNN and FOX’s viewership.
However, this new era of technology where folks in Newark can view an incident in Minneapolis
almost instantaneously has its disadvantages.1 Those drawbacks from having immediate access to
information come at the cost of a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial. The tensions between
the free press and the rights of a criminal defendant to have a fair trial are not new to American
history.2 As case law demonstrates, the press has always been fascinated with high-profile criminal
cases, going as far back as Vice President Aaron Burr’s treason trial in 1807.3
The Sixth Amendment protects the accused by guaranteeing them the right to an impartial
jury and a speedy public trial.4 At the same time, the First Amendment prohibits Congress from
making laws abridging the freedom of speech and press. 5 Therefore, the public’s right to access
and the media’s right to unfettered coverage of a case has caused concern regarding a high-profile
defendant’s right to a fair trial. In an age where every potential jury has seen the evidence either
on television or their smartphone, it is challenging for high-profile criminal defendants to exercise
their Sixth Amendment rights.6 Criminal defendants must survive their trial by media before
entering the courtroom. For instance, it was nearly impossible to find jurors who neither heard of
nor saw the gut-wrenching video of the former police officer, Derek Chauvin, kneeling on George
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Floyd’s neck.7 In the wake of the video, the Black Lives Matter Movement successfully used social
media to inspire social change and facilitate nationwide protests, specifically by utilizing the
hashtag #BlackLivesMatter.8 The use of social media and hashtags to spread awareness and create
social movements is only increasing.9 Despite all the good social media does, it makes it more
difficult for high-profile criminal defendants to have a fair trial. 10
Thus, the expansive rights of the First Amendment in the twenty-first century are diluting
the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a fair trial by an impartial jury. The mass media’s infatuation
with high-profile criminal trials adds the pressure of the public on the prosecutor’s back like never
before, encouraging them to win even at the cost of justice. Defense attorneys face an uphill battle
from the moment the evidence goes viral. They not only have to compete with prosecutors but an
increasingly intrusive press.
This paper examines the conflict between the First and Sixth Amendments, given the rapid
technological and communication changes over the years. Together the First and Sixth
Amendments protect fairness and uphold accountability in our criminal justice system. 11 Jointly,
both rights broadly safeguard the right to a fair trial by eliminating the unfairness of secret
proceedings, yet they are fundamentally different. 12 The First Amendment protects the public’s
right to access a criminal proceeding, whereas the Sixth Amendment protects the criminal
defendant’s right to have a fair trial with a public audience. 13 This paper will first explore the
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history of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment pertaining to high-profile
criminal proceedings. Second, this paper will analyze the case law regarding pretrial publicity in
the United States and explore how technology and the media have changed the Court ’s
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. Next, it will evaluate how the high-profile nature of a case
affects the prosecution and defense. This section will also discuss how both sides take advantage
of extrajudicial statements. Lastly, section four examines the available remedies to pretrial
publicity, particularly focusing on the British and American approaches to controlling pretrial bias.
Overall, the paper points out the many issues of litigating a high-profile criminal case, ultimately
arguing that the American approach of jury controls coupled with actively discouraging attorneys
from making prejudicial statements to the press is preferable to England ’s restrictions on free
speech.
I.

HISTORY OF THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO ACCESS UNDER THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court has guaranteed the media and the public’s right to access through a

combination of freedom of speech, press, and assembly, characterizing this as the “freedom to
listen.”14 Before the Norman Conquest of 1066, parties brought cases before moots in England,
and all freemen were required to attend. 15 A moot is a local or county court where the freemen
acted as jurors.16 Over the years, the common law relaxed these mandatory attendance rules, but
the moots remained open to freemen.17 England brought their traditions of public criminal trials to
the United States during the colonial period. 18 For instance, New Jersey, one of the original
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colonies, unambiguously proclaimed that all criminal trials must remain open to the public. 19 In
England and the United States, public criminal trials were a presumptive, indispensable right
throughout the centuries.20 However, social media and other technologies have allowed the media
to cover cases in ways that the Founding Fathers could not have fathomed.21
The common law has always considered public criminal trials as a check on the
government.22 In the United States, the media, protected by the First Amendment, satisfies this
historical role and acts on the people’s behalf by monitoring the government.23 The reporters and
journalists enter the courtroom to stay informed and ensure the government does not overstep its
bounds.24 However, the media’s coverage of criminal trials has expanded dramatically in the last
few decades.25 This expansion and increased reporting of criminal trials have resulted in an
increased number of appeals.26 Criminal defendants argue that the media tainted their trials by
increasing juror bias in these appeals. Thus, the media’s insatiable appetite to access criminal
proceedings has increased the difficulty for trial judges in guaranteeing that high-profile criminal
defendants receive fair trials.27 This section explores the case law that expanded the First
Amendment’s right to access criminal proceedings, much to the chagrin of high-profile criminal
defendants.
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A. The Media and Public’s Right to Access Criminal Trials
The seminal First Amendment case revolving around criminal trials is Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.28 In this murder case, the defendant was on his fourth trial, as the
first three ended in mistrials.29 In particular, the third resulted in a mistrial because a prospective
juror read about the previous trials in a newspaper and told other potential jurors about the case.30
Subsequently, the defense counsel brought a motion to close the court to the public in the present
case, and the prosecution did not object.31 The trial judge complied and closed the proceedings to
the press and public.32 Reporters covering the case objected to the closure order arguing that it
violated the First Amendment.33 In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court sided with the reporters,
holding that the public and press have a First Amendment right to access criminal trials.34
The plurality opinion relied heavily on historical evidence to demonstrate that AngloAmerican criminal trials have long been presumptively open.35 Further, such openness was critical
to the “proper functioning of a trial” since it assured the government conducted criminal
proceedings fairly.36 The Court reasoned that a courtroom’s openness discourages perjury,
participant misconduct, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality. 37 Open trials also give the
perception of fairness, thus enhancing public confidence in American jurisprudence while
discouraging vigilantism.38 Significantly, the plurality opinion did note that the right was not
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absolute.39 The Chief Justice concluded the opinion by stating, “[a]bsent an overriding interest
articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public.”40 In Richmond
Newspapers, the Supreme Court held for the first time that the press and public have a right to
access criminal trial proceedings and standing to challenge the denial of access under the First
Amendment.41
Additionally, Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers outlined a
two-part test to determine which government activities the public should be able to access. 42 First,
a historical prong, where courts consider whether there exists “an enduring and vital tradition of
public entry to particular proceedings or information.”43 Second, courts evaluate the instrumental
value of the press and the public’s access to specific government activities. 44 Later, this test became
dubbed the “experience and logic” or “history and function” test.45 The First Amendment right of
access attaches if a trial or proceeding passes the history and function test.46 The press and public’s
right to access is not absolute, and a judge can close a court if the closure survives strict scrutiny.47
Chief Justice Burger’s plurality opinion and Justice Brennan’s concurrence represented a majority
for the proposition that the public and press have an implicit right under the First Amendment to
attend criminal trials.48
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Two years later, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
but refined Richmond Newspapers’ holding.49 The majority in Globe adopted Justice Brennan’s
two-part history and function test.50 At issue in Globe was a Massachusetts statute that barred the
public and press from the courtroom while a child victim testified in rape, incest, or sexual offense
cases.51 The purpose of the mandatory closure was to protect the victims from trauma,
embarrassment, or humiliation brought on by media coverage. 52 Citing the Court’s decision in
Richmond Newspapers, the appellant, a newspaper, moved that the Court revoke the closure order,
arguing that it had a right to attend the entire criminal trial. 53 The Supreme Court agreed with the
newspaper and reversed the trial court on appeal.54 This time in the majority, Justice Brennan relied
on his history and function test to hold the statute invalid. 55 The majority explained that “...the
criminal trial historically has been open to the press and general public,” and “...access to criminal
trials plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the
government as a whole.”56 The Court reasoned that underlying the First Amendment right of access
to criminal trials is the understanding that a critical purpose of that Amendment is to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs. 57 The media and public’s access to criminal trials is
another check on the judicial process, leading to fairness and the perception of fairness. 58
Since Richmond Newspapers already established criminal trials meet the history and
function pre-test, there was no need to apply the same test to the particular sub-category, criminal
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rape trials.59 The burden then shifted to the State to demonstrate that their closure law met the
demanding standard of strict scrutiny by proving “the denial is necessitated by a compelling
governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”60 The majority found that
although the closure served a compelling government interest by protecting minor victims from
the humiliation of testifying during sex crimes trials, a mandatory closure was not necessary. 61
B. The Media and Public’s Right to Access Pretrial Criminal Proceedings
Per the holdings in Richmond Newspapers and Globe, the First Amendment protects the
public’s right to access criminal trials.62 It was not until a few years later, in the two PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California cases of 1984 and 1986, that the Supreme Court
extended the First Amendment to pretrial proceedings. 63 Beginning with the earlier of the two
cases, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California (Press-Enterprise I) involved the
openness of the voir dire examination of potential jurors. 64 The underlying facts are quite
gruesome, involving the rape and murder of a teenage girl. 65 The petitioner, a newspaper company,
moved the Court to open the voir dire examinations to the public and press. 66 The Press outlet
argued that they had an absolute right to attend the trial and reasoned that the trial began with jury
selection.67 The prosecution objected, claiming that the press’s presence would interfere with the
candidness of the jury’s responses.68 The trial court judge ruled against the newspaper company
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and only opened the general voir dire to the public, approximately three days of the six-week voir
dire process.69 The judge also denied the press’s motion to release the voir dire transcripts. 70
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial judge, reasoning that historically jury
selection, both in the United States and England, has presumptively been public with exceptions
only for a good cause shown.71 The majority traced the roots of public jury trials to the days before
the Norman conquest of England, stressing the importance of the public’s presence.72 The Court
explained that the public’s right to attend criminal voir dire promotes fairness and the appearance
of fairness which is critical for public confidence in our legal system. 73 Public proceedings have a
“community therapeutic value” in heinous criminal trials, reassuring the public that “the law is
being enforced and the criminal justice system is functioning.”74 People in a free democratic
society would find it difficult to accept results they could not see. 75 Thus, the Supreme Court held
that both prongs of the history and function test satisfied and found a presumptive right to access
criminal voir dire proceedings.76 The closure did not survive strict scrutiny either because the trial
judge had alternatives to a total closure, such as offering limited public access or partial
suppression.77
Finally, the last of the Court’s major First Amendment public access cases came in 1986
in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II).78 Press-Enterprise II extended
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the First Amendment right to access to preliminary hearings in criminal prosecutions. 79 At issue
was the trial court’s decision to seal the transcripts from the infamous defendant Robert Diaz’s
forty-one-day preliminary hearing, which determined probable cause. 80 Diaz, nicknamed by the
media the Angel of Death, was a nurse accused of murdering twelve of his patients by
administering massive doses of heart medication.81 Per a California statute, the defendant moved
to exclude the public from the preliminary hearing.82 The Magistrate granted the unopposed
motion, reasoning that the closure was necessary since the case had attracted national publicity.83
After the hearing, the petitioner, a newspaper company, requested the court release the preliminary
hearing transcripts.84 The defendant opposed the motion arguing that the transcript would cause
prejudicial pretrial publicity, and the trial judge agreed. 85 On appeal, the Supreme Court once again
relied upon Justice Brennan’s two-prong test and determined that the hearing should be open to
the press and public.86
Citing the previous cases and others, the Court concluded that criminal hearings and
proceedings were historically open to the public.87 For instance, Chief Justice Marshall held the
probable cause hearing for Aaron Burr’s treason trial in the Hall of the House of Delegates in
Virginia because the courtroom was too small to accommodate the interested public.88 Over two
hundred years later, there has been a near-uniform practice of conducting preliminary hearings in
open courts for federal and state cases. 89 Moreover, the Court held that public access plays a
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significant positive role in the functioning of the preliminary hearing.90 California’s preliminary
hearings share many of the same features as full-blown criminal trials.91 Like trials, “[t]he accused
has the right to personally appear at the hearing, to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine
hostile witnesses, to present exculpatory evidence, and to exclude illegally obtained evidence.”92
Therefore, Chief Justice Burger’s majority held that the First Amendment right of access applies
to criminal trials and preliminary hearings that function as a full-scale trial.93
C. The Media and Public’s Right to Access Limited
Press-Enterprise II noted that not every criminal proceeding should be public.94 For
example, Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest clarifies that the grand jury system depends
upon secrecy to function appropriately.95 Although Petrol Stops Northwest is a civil case, it is still
pertinent to this paper’s analysis of the First Amendment pertaining to criminal trials. Petrol Stops
Northwest gives several reasons why a grand jury proceeding should be kept private.96 First, it
encourages prospective grand jury witnesses to testify fully and honestly, without fear of
retaliation.97 Also, the secrecy reduces the risk of the potential defendant fleeing or trying to
persuade or intimidate potential grand jurors. 98 Finally, the private nature of the grand jury
proceeding protects those persons who were accused but exonerated from public mockery and
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humiliation.99 However, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6(e) allow for the disclosure of
grand jury transcripts under limited exceptions.100
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not extended the First Amendment’s right of public
access to juvenile proceedings.101 Lower courts split on the issue of whether the First Amendment
access right applies to juvenile court proceedings under Justice Brennan’s two-part test.102
Typically, courts have found no right to access juvenile delinquency or dependency proceedings,
reasoning that they fail the history prong of Justice Brennan’s Test.103
II.

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND PREJUDICIAL PRETRIAL PUBLICITY
As previously noted, the Anglo-American history of criminal trials exhibits a presumption

of openness.104 One can trace this history back to before the Battle of Hastings in 1066.105
However, the presumption of openness often causes conflicts between the First and Sixth
Amendments, pitting the press against the criminal defendant. 106 Addressing the conflict, Chief
Justice Burger stated: “some criminal cases characterized as ‘sensational’ have been subjected to
extensive coverage by news media, sometimes seriously interfering with the conduct of the
proceedings and creating a setting wholly inappropriate for the administration of justice.”107
Advances in technology have only exacerbated the issue, enabling the media to cover criminal
trials more thoroughly and feed the public’s growing appetite for them.108
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For example, before the trial of O.J. Simpson, four out of five lawyers surveyed believed
that the case’s intense publicity would interfere with Simpson’s right to a fair trial.109 Even though
the jury acquitted O.J. Simpson of the double murder, the media and public found him guilty in
the court of public opinion.110 In his unrelated robbery charge, Simpson’s defense team alleged
that the prosecution and law enforcement were more interested in getting justice for Nicole Brown
Simpson and Ronald Goldman than in the present case. 111 Therefore, this section will examine the
progression of Sixth Amendment case law, evaluating the effects of the public and media on a
high-profile criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial.
A. History of Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity in the United States
In the United States, the constitutional clash between the First and Sixth Amendments came
to a head for the first time during Aaron Burr’s treason trial.112 Former Vice President Burr faced
treason charges after allegedly making plans to conquer New Orleans and invade Mexico. 113 Due
to Burr’s notoriety and the political nature of the crime, newspapers across the country extensively
covered the proceedings leading up to trial.114 For the first time, a young America questioned the
judiciary’s ability to provide a high-profile criminal defendant with a fair trial per the Sixth
Amendment.115 The Circuit Court of Virginia was perplexed with the problem of prejudicial
pretrial publicity and juror disqualification. 116 Chief Justice Marshall, who presided over the trial,
explained: “Were it possible to obtain a jury without any prepossessions whatever respecting the
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guilt or innocence of the accused, it would be extremely desirable to obtain such a jury; but this is
perhaps impossible, and therefore will not be required.”117 Marshall reasoned that being exposed
to pretrial publicity was not enough to warrant dismissal. 118 A court was only to disqualify a
potential juror if they could not put their biases to the side.119 The Chief Justice dismissed fortyfour of forty-eight potential jurors on the first day of voir dire because of the newspapers’
prejudicial influence on them.120
Over one hundred and twenty years later, the issue of prejudicial media coverage on legal
proceedings resurfaced with Bruno Hauptmann’s trial.121 Bruno Hauptmann was on trial for the
kidnapping and murder of the baby of famed aviator and former presidential candidate Charles
Lindbergh.122 Charles Lindbergh’s fame, coupled with the shocking nature of the crime and
advances in camera and recording technology, made this case a perfect storm for a media
extravaganza.123 Before the arrest, the media obsessively reported every break in the case and
saturated the news with the police’s progress.124 When the police finally arrested Hauptmann,
nearly seven hundred reporters, including one hundred and twenty camera operators, invaded the
tiny New Jersey courthouse.125 Competing with one another to get better pictures, photographers
climbed over the defense and prosecution’s tables during proceedings.126
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On appeal, Hauptmann unsuccessfully raised the issue of pretrial prejudice, arguing that
the media frenzy in the courtroom interfered with his case.127 The Appellate Court exclaimed: “If
the result of an important murder trial is to be nullified by newspaper stories and radio broadcasts,
few convictions will stand.”128 In response to the media circus, the American Bar Association
(A.B.A.) in 1937 recommended a ban on cameras in the courtroom in Canon 35 of the A.B.A.
Canons of Judicial Ethics.129 Due to the advances in technology that allowed the media to cover
criminal trials more extensively, American legal scholars became acutely more aware of the
conflict between the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the media’s right of access.130 Thus, local
trials became national news throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.131 For instance,
the trial of George Zimmerman, arising out of the killing of Trayvon Martin in Sanford, Florida,
captured the attention of the nation.132 Media outlets from Fox News to Oprah Winfrey’s daytime
talk show covered the case.133 Even the President of the United States, Barack Obama, commented
on the case: “If I had a son, he’d look like Trayvon.”134 With the help of the media and
technological advances, local trials and issues have become national news.135
B. Modern Age of Media and Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity
Almost two decades after Hauptmann’s unsuccessful appeal, the United States Supreme
Court heard one of its first cases balancing a defendant’s right to a fair trial with the media’s right
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to access.136 In Stroble v. California, the State convicted the defendant of the heinous murder of a
six-year-old girl.137 To the defendant’s frustration, he confessed the murder after his arrest,138 and
the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office released excerpts of his confession to newspapers.139
The office announced their belief that the defendant was both sane and guilty to the media.140
Following the release of the excerpts, the media’s headlines and in-text articles described the
defendant as a werewolf, fiend, and a sex-mad killer.141 The defendant argued that the
inflammatory media reports made it impossible for him to have a fair trial. 142
Writing for the majority, Justice Clark rejected the defendant’s claim that a fair trial in Los
Angeles was impossible because of the media’s prejudicial accounts of him and the trial. 143 The
majority reasoned that the defendant never made an affirmative showing that the press prejudiced
any jurors, and the Court required more proof than a mere declaration that the trial was not fair.144
The majority stated that: “...at no stage of the proceedings has petitioner offered so much as an
affidavit to prove that any juror was in fact prejudiced by the newspaper stories.”145 The Court was
unsympathetic, noting the defendant never moved for a change of venue nor complained about the
public until after the conviction.146 Therefore, a defendant had to prove that the media prejudiced
the jury for a court to reverse a conviction. 147
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The Supreme Court changed its tune in Marshall v. United States only seven years later.148
In Marshall, the Supreme Court made its first notable stand against trials by the media. 149 At issue
was that several jury members read about the defendant’s prior convictions in newspapers.150 The
newspapers told stories about how the defendant prescribed restricted drugs to the famed country
singer Hank Williams before his death.151 The defendant was convicted because the trial judge
refused to grant the defendant’s motion for a mistrial despite knowing the newspaper articles
prejudiced the jury.152 In a short opinion, the Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial,
reasoning that “the prejudice to the defendant is almost certain to be as great when that evidence
reaches the jury through news accounts as when it is a part of the prosecution’s evidence.”153 The
Court attempted to balance and remedy the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the media’s right to
freedom of the press for the first time.154
In 1963, in Rideau v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court further distanced itself from its prior
decision in Stroble, which required a defendant to show actual prejudice before succeeding on a
Sixth Amendment claim.155 In Rideau, the Court adopted Marshall’s implied rationale that allowed
for reversals when there was presumed prejudice. 156 The defendant in Rideau was arrested and
convicted of bank robbery, kidnapping, and murder. 157 The defendant also confessed to the crimes
following his arrest.158 A sheriff recorded the defendant’s confession, and over the next few days,
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television stations repeatedly broadcasted the footage. 159 The Court estimated that of the town’s
150,000 people, approximately 29,000 people saw and heard the interview. 160 Despite this
egregious example of pretrial prejudice, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a change
of venue, and the defendant was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. 161
The Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction explaining the trial court’s refusal
to change venue violated the defendant’s due process rights because the media coverage repeatedly
exposed the potential jurors to the defendant’s confession.162 The Court claimed that the television
broadcast “...was Rideau’s trial -- at which he pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent court
proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow
formality.”163 The televised confession was enough to create a presumption of juror bias. 164 The
trial judge exacerbated the situation when he did not grant the change of venue motion.165
Therefore, Rideau loosened the standard for presumed prejudice. 166
Two years later, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of prejudicial pretrial publicity in
the physical courtroom in Estes v. Texas.167 The defendant unsuccessfully moved to prevent the
media from broadcasting the trial proceedings.168 Consequently, the initial proceedings were
broadcast live across the country via television and radio. 169 Later, the State convicted the
defendant of swindling.170 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction by a narrow
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margin.171 The Court held that the televising of the defendant’s pretrial proceedings warranted a
reversal because the publicity violated his due process rights. 172 The media made the courtroom
look like a poorly made movie set. At least twelve different cameramen were in the courtroom
televising the proceedings, wires slithered across the floor, and microphones littered the
benches.173 The Court stated most due process deprivation claims “...require a showing of
identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at times a procedure employed by the State
involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due
process.”174 The majority listed four different ways in which televised court proceedings can cause
unfairness to criminal defendants.175 These included: “(1) the impact on the jurors, (2) the
impairment of testimony, (3) the additional responsibilities placed upon the judge, and (4) the
impact upon the defendant.”176
One year later, in Sheppard v. Maxwell, the doctrine of presumed prejudice reached its
pinnacle when the Supreme Court reversed Dr. Sam Sheppard’s second-degree murder conviction
because of the prejudice he suffered from negative publicity. 177 The case resulted from the murder
of Sam Sheppard’s pregnant wife in their home.178 The media was drawn to the gory case from the
beginning, constantly accusing Sheppard of the murder. 179 The case drenched the media, and
sensationalist headlines portrayed Sheppard in a negative light. 180 For example, the headlines
boldly claimed that Sheppard refused to cooperate with police and refused to take a lie detector
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test.181 On the day of his wife’s funeral, the chief prosecutor of the case even went so far as to
publicly criticize Sheppard and his family for alleged lack of cooperation.
Further, at the Coroner’s request, Sheppard “… reenacted the tragedy at his home before
the Coroner, police officers, and a group of newsmen, who apparently were invited by the
Coroner… Sheppard’s performance was reported in detail by the news media along with
photographs.”182 Not to mention, the trial took place only a few weeks before the election of the
trial judge and the chief prosecutor.183 The media also photographed and televised the jurors every
time they walked in or out of the courtroom, adding to the media circus.184 Unsurprisingly, the jury
convicted Shepherd with the media’s attention fixated on them.185
In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court reversed Shepherd’s conviction and remanded the
case for a new trial.186 Like Rideau and Estes, the majority did not require the defendant to
demonstrate that he suffered identifiable prejudice. 187 The Court opined that it could use the totality
of the circumstances to determine on a case-by-case basis that prejudice likely existed. 188 The
majority scolded the lower Court by stating, “legal trials are not like elections, to be won through
the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper.”189 The Court concluded the trial court
did not attempt to protect the jury from the media. 190 The Shepherd Court listed a few acceptable
methods of mitigating harmful effects of pretrial publicity, such as “controlling the atmosphere of
the courtroom, insulating witnesses from publicity, controlling leaks from law enforcement
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personnel, changing the venue, granting a continuance, and sequestering the jury.”191 Thus, based
on the totality of the circumstances, the Court presumed there was a reasonable likelihood of
prejudice.192
C. The Court’s Current Approach to Pretrial Publicity
In 1975, in Murphy v. Florida, the Supreme Court altered their previous analysis and
demonstrated a reluctance to presume prejudice in high-profile criminal trials.193 In Murphy, the
defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit robbery and breaking into a home while
armed with intent to commit robbery. 194 The defendant appealed his conviction arguing that he
was denied a fair trial due to the media’s extensive reporting on his prior convictions.195
Previously, the defendant earned notoriety in the press for participating in the 1964 stealing of the
Star of India Sapphire and a handful of other crimes. 196 The media was so enthralled with his
previous life of crime that they nicknamed him “Murph the Smurf.”197 As a result of the media’s
obsessive coverage, multiple jurors were aware of the defendant’s past charges and convictions.198
Despite that fact, the majority upheld the defendant’s conviction, reasoning that jurors need not
“be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.”199
The Supreme Court distinguished the present case from their prior decisions by stating that
the prior case law cannot “...stand for the proposition that juror exposure to information about a
state defendant’s prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he is charged alone
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presumptively deprives the defendant of due process.”200 Notably, the Court found that Marshall’s
holding has no application beyond the federal courts. 201 In the present case, the voir dire
demonstrated no hostility to the defendant from the jurors and did not indicate that they were
incapable of laying aside their partiality. 202 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, concluded
that under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant failed to demonstrate that he faced
prejudice during the voir dire process or the trial. 203 The Court did not provide much guidance on
the totality of the circumstances test.204 Nonetheless, Murphy established a new precedent that
resulted in appellate courts reversing fewer convictions because of pretrial publicity.205
Furthermore, in Chandler v. Florida, the Court reasoned that there would no longer be a
presumption of prejudice from televised criminal proceedings broadcast because of new
technological advancements.206 At the time of the decision, more and more states allowed the press
to cover their criminal proceedings via television. 207 The majority made clear in Murphy and
reaffirmed in the present case that “[t]o demonstrate prejudice in a specific case a defendant must
show something more than juror awareness that the trial is such as to attract the attention of
broadcasters.”208 The Court stated there would no longer be a presumption of prejudice. 209 The
defendant must make an actual showing that the media compromised his ability to have a fair
trial.210 For instance, if the defendant could show that a juror watched television accounts of the
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trial in violation of a judge’s instruction, the defendant could show prejudice.211 Therefore, the
defendant on appeal must demonstrate that the media’s coverage hindered the jury’s power to
judge his trial fairly or that the media’s coverage adversely affected the participants in such a way
that it resulted in a denial of the defendant’s due process rights.212 The previous cases illustrate
that the Supreme Court has walked back the strong Sixth Amendment protections endorsed by the
Sheppard Court.213

III.

THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC’S EFFECT ON THE COURT AND ITS OFFICERS
When the American public becomes infatuated with a high-profile criminal case, the roles

of the prosecutor and defense counsel seemingly change. 214 A criminal trial, as opposed to a civil
trial, is already a high-stakes affair.215 All parties involved are aware that what is at stake is not
merely a change of money but the potential deprivation of an individual’s liberty or life.216 When
the media and public become involved, the stereotypical criminal trial becomes more akin to a
spectacle one would see on a screen.217 Therefore, scholars often criticize lawyers in high-profile
criminal trials, as seen in People v. Simpson.218 They complain that the attorneys become obsessed
with the camera and allow the public’s attention to affect their expected roles as officers of the
Court.219
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A. The Media and Public’s Effect on the Prosecutor
Prosecutors have heightened pressure to make a conviction when a high-profile crime,
usually heinous or politically charged, captures the public’s attention.220 In these cases,
prosecutors’ offices will dedicate excessive resources to obtain a conviction, even when the
evidence is weak or nonexistent.221 For example, throughout Kyle Rittenhouse’s trial, legal experts
made clear that an acquittal would not be a surprising verdict based on the facts of his case.222
Nonetheless, the Kenosha prosecutors still dedicated their resources to a trial that ultimately
resulted in the jury acquitting defendant Kyle Rittenhouse of all charges. 223 Although the cost of
the prosecution is not yet known, reports estimate that Kenosha County taxpayers paid hundreds
of thousands, if not millions of dollars, just for the case to end in an acquittal. 224 For reference, the
trial of Derek Chauvin cost Hennepin County taxpayers an estimated 3.7 million dollars. 225
Additionally, the nation’s attention on a criminal case can cause a prosecutor to become
overzealous.226 Prosecutorial misconduct can cause irreparable harm to the system and the lives of
the individuals involved in the case, including prosecutors themselves. 227 For instance, the Durham
County District Attorney Mike Nifong chose to continue prosecuting a case against three young
men on Duke University’s lacrosse team despite knowing the evidence was weak, and the rape
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allegations were most likely false.228 Nifong refused to “...disclose potentially exculpatory
information regarding male DNA on items in the accuser’s rape examination kit; he did not comply
with discovery and disclosure requirements; and he made false statements to opposing counsel,
the court, and the bar regarding the DNA.”229 Nifong set aside his public and ethical duties and
continued pushing the complainant’s allegations forward despite knowing they were false.230
North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper ended the criminal prosecution, proclaimed the
mens’ innocence, and branded Nifong as a rogue prosecutor.231 Cooper described the case as
“…the tragic result of a rush to accuse and a failure to verify serious allegations.”232
In North Carolina, as in many other places across the country, prosecutors and district
attorneys like Nifong are elected.233 Some legal scholars argue the elections motivate prosecutors
to rush to judgment to please their constituents. 234 When Nifong became involved in the Duke
lacrosse case, he was also engaged in a bitter primary campaign. 235 His competitor led the polls
after successfully prosecuting a high-profile case herself.236 Nifong’s campaign manager at the
time quoted him as stating, in reference to the Duke lacrosse case, “I'm getting a million dollars of
free advertisements."237 Nifong's self-interest resulted in his disbarment and a minor jail
sentence.238 Prosecutors must be careful not to be overzealous, like Nifong, when trying high-
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profile cases.239 Any mistakes they make can result in public resentment and disappointment in
the American legal system and democracy. 240
B. The Media and Public's Effect on Defense Council
Criminal defense attorneys owe a primary duty to their clients to ensure the administration
of justice is served by bravely and effectively advocating for their clients so that their constitutional
and legal rights are protected.241 Theoretically, the adversarial system weighs in favor of criminal
defense attorneys as the prosecution bears the burden of proving their case beyond a reasonable
doubt.242 However, in reality, the prosecution has the advantage due to the number of resources
when trying a case.243 There are other disadvantages to representing high-profile criminal clients
other than lack of resources.244 For example, advocating for a defendant in a high-profile case can
be frightening and dangerous for the defense attorney and their families. 245 For instance, Chris
Darden received death threats almost immediately via Instagram, Facebook, and by phone upon
the public discovering he was representing Eric Holder, the man accused of killing beloved rapper
Nipsey Hussle.246 This is not to say that prosecutors do not face similar hostilities when
prosecuting high-profile clients.247 No stranger to high-profile cases, Darden also received death
threats while working as a co-prosecutor on the O.J. Simpson murder trial. 248
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Furthermore, criminal defense attorneys receive fame and notoriety from working on
criminal cases that captivate the public's interest. 249 However, with fame comes feuds. The egos
of the criminal defense attorneys collide, which causes rifts and drama in their def ense teams,
diverting the public's attention away from legal arguments and directing it towards the lawyers
themselves.250 Notably, throughout the O.J. Simpson murder trial, the "Dream Team" fought
amongst themselves both privately and publicly.251 In particular, Johnnie Cochran and Robert
Shapiro competed over who would lead Simpson's defense team, with Cochran eventually winning
out.252 After the trial, Cochran commented on their internal competition, stating: "We did not
realize the damage it would do to [Shapiro's] ego not to be lead attorney."253 Despite the "Dream
Team's'' success, Shapiro publicly stated he would never work with Cochran again. 254 Although
Simpson received an acquittal, criminal defense attorneys should nonetheless be cautious not to
allow their egos to dominate the case.255 Not only is it distracting, but it adds fuel to the fire that is
the media circus.256
C. Extrajudicial Statements to the Press and Public
As previously discussed, the First Amendment protects the public's access to information
and limits efforts to control the flow of information coming from a court. 257 With that said, many
legal scholars suggest that both the prosecution and criminal defense attorneys should limit their
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interactions with the media and public during an ongoing trial.258 In high-profile criminal cases,
attorneys tend to turn to the press to try and get an advantage over their adversaries.259 However,
these extrajudicial statements "can seriously jeopardize the right to a fair trial, distract attention
from the matters properly at hand, and create a carnival atmosphere that undermines confidence in
the legal system furthering public distrust in the legal profession."260 For instance, before Shapiro
became involved in the People v. Simpson litigation, he published an article, Using the Media to
Your Advantage, teaching lawyers how to manipulate the press. 261 His essay argues that attorneys
should take advantage of the press in any way possible to further their client's interests. 262
Simpson's defense team wholeheartedly adopted Shapiro's philosophy of taking advantage
of the press through manipulation by extrajudicial statements. 263 From the onset, Simpson's
attorneys publicly floated the idea that Los Angeles police detective Mark Fuhrman was a racist
who planted evidence to implicate Simpson in the murders of Nicole Simpson and Ronald
Goldman.264 The former pro football player's "Dream Team" went so far as to cast doubt on the
trial procedures and safeguards themselves.265 Shapiro exclaimed to the press that the prosecution
participated in: "an insidious effort to try to get black jurors removed for cause because they [were]
black, because they [had] black heroes, and because O.J. Simpson [was] one of them."266 The
prosecution responded in kind, making their own prejudicial statements to the media. 267 For
example, the prosecution claimed Simpson's defense team was trying to make the case about race
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in "just the latest in a series of efforts to try to manipulate public opinion."268 The attorneys litigated
two trials simultaneously, one in the courtroom for the jurors and one in the media for the public.
California had not adopted Rule 3.6 of the A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which warns lawyers not to make extrajudicial statements that a reasonable person would expect
to prejudice the preceding.269 The Golden State opted to leave the issue of attorney speech to the
discretion of trial judges like Judge Ito, the trial judge presiding over Simpson's case.
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scholars criticize Ito for his lack of control over the attorneys and their comments to the press.271
Despite threatening the prosecution and defense with a gag order, Ito opted not to issue one to the
media's delight.272 Ito's idleness allowed both the prosecution and defense to make whatever public
statements they saw fit, only held back by their perceptions of public opinion and the possible
threat of sanctions if they went too far. 273 As a direct result of the Simpson case and the failings of
Ito to effectively control the attorneys, California adopted a rule of professional conduct similar to
Rule 3.6.274
Due to spectacles like O.J. Simpson's trial, legal scholars suggest that lawyers should say
as little as possible to the media before and during a high-profile case to maintain a professional
atmosphere.275 As the legal profession regulates itself, both the prosecution and defense should
take it upon themselves to avoid making prejudicial extrajudicial statements despite their First
Amendment right to do so.276 Every extrajudicial statement made to the press during a high-profile
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criminal case adds to the carnival atmosphere and interferes with a criminal defendant 's sacred
right to a fair trial.277
IV.

CONTROLLING PRETRIAL PUBLICITY

In the United States and England, there is a debate over whether jurors can be impartial
when faced with the tidal wave of media coverage that comes along with a high-profile criminal
defendant's trial.278 It is quite an arduous task to ask a juror in a criminal case that invokes intense
public interest to put aside their biases.279 The task becomes more onerous when the judge asks
the jurors to ignore everything they may have heard about the case in the news and decide the facts
solely on the evidence presented at trial.280 In the United States, the legal community believes that
courts can uphold the Sixth Amendment’s right to a fair trial without sacrificing the fundamental
rights of the First Amendment.281 Therefore, American judges utilize a handful of remedies to
combat pretrial publicity that do not involve censoring free speech.282 However, in England, they
take the opposite approach and limit freedoms of expression to ensure high-profile criminal
defendants receive a fair trial.283 This section will discuss the British and American approaches to
protecting defendants' rights in high-profile criminal cases noting the numerous flaws in both and
ultimately finding the American remedies preferable to censorship.
A. British Approach
The United States and England face similar difficulties in protecting criminal defendants'
rights from the dangers of pretrial publicity.284 These two common-law juggernauts share the same
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goal of guaranteeing fair trials.285 However, they utilize different approaches.286 English
jurisprudence relies on the common law doctrine of contempt of court to regulate the mass
media.287 The British, understanding the potential dangers that come along with the United States'
seemingly unlimited First Amendment guarantees, impose restrictions on their press to control the
media's coverage of criminal trials.288 People in Great Britain "find American media coverage of
criminal trials excessive, and American laws permitting widespread publicity surrounding criminal
trials troubling."289
Hollywoodesque trials, like O.J. Simpson's murder trial, do not happen in England due to
stricter media restrictions.290 In England, "[c]ertain information, especially reports of confessions
made by criminal defendants and details of defendants' prior convictions, is considered inherently
prejudicial."291 While American jurisprudence focuses on controlling the jury, the British have
chosen to limit the rights of the press in covering criminal trials. 292 As a result, "American-style
jury controls are considered unnecessary in England. There is no voir dire of prospective jurors,
juries are rarely sequestered, and changes of venue are practically nonexistent."
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Americans

would likely reject England's restrictions on the media because of their passionate devotion to the
First Amendment.294
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The Queen's Courts have halted prosecutions and gone so far as to dismiss charges when
newspapers detrimentally interfered with a defendant's right to a fair trial. 295 English courts have
even punished newspaper editors for prejudicially interfering in criminal proceedings by making
false reports.296 For instance, in the 1949 murder trial of English serial killer John G. Haigh,
commonly known as the Acid Bath Murderer, a newspaper falsely reported that Haigh had been
charged with several murders and even listed names of other victims. 297 In reality, the prosecution
had only charged Haigh with the murder of one woman.298 Therefore, the Lord Chief Justice of
England, Lord Goddard, denounced the tabloid paper's actions as sensational pandering and
sentenced the editor to three months imprisonment, and fined his newspaper £10,000.299 Lord
Goddard concluded his opinion by warning the newspaper that if "... they should again venture to
publish such matter as this, the directors themselves might find that the arm of the Court was long
enough to reach them and to deal with them individually."300 Americans may find the British
approach draconian, but it nonetheless minimizes the spread of misinformation and centralizes the
focus on the trial at hand.301
B. American Approach
Although the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to a
trial by an impartial jury, the internet makes that increasingly difficult.302 With the growth of the
internet, it seems to be quite tricky, if not impossible, to have a jury that limits itself entirely to the
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testimony heard at trial.303 To combat pretrial publicity, American judges use a variety of remedies
that do not censor free speech.304 Notably, American jurisprudence relies on the voir dire process
to vet potentially biased jurors.305 Voir dire is the "preliminary examination of prospective jurors
to determine their qualifications and suitability to serve on a jury, in order to ensure the selection
of a fair and impartial jury."306 American courts heavily rely on the voir dire process to impanel
an impartial jury free from bias.307 For American judges, the voir dire process is their first line of
defense against bias.308 For example, legal scholars credit the trial judge's extensive use of the voir
dire process, coupled with sequestration in Charles Manson's murder and conspiracy trial, as a key
factor in protecting Manson's right to a fair trial in the face of a media frenzy. 309
Unfortunately, many American judges refuse to recognize the true threat that media and
publicity can have on a criminal trial and doubt the severity of which pretrial publicity influences
jurors.310 For instance, voir dire in high-profile cases incorrectly assumes potential jurors know
nothing about well-known defendants. 311 Studies also indicate that jurors are not always honest
when answering questions regarding their biases.312 Exclusionary evidence rules are worthless
when jurors have already seen the evidence via the media. 313 One can even view the voir dire
process itself as prejudicial, "since the defense is forced to ask questions that highlight the very
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issues it wants to suppress."314 Still, when taken seriously, the process results in the dismissal of
biased jurors more often than not.315
In addition, voir dire can be very expensive for taxpayers in high-profile cases.316 Their bill
only increases when courts sequester juries. 317 The longer the case drags on, the more expensive
it is for taxpayers.318 Notably, the trial judge sequestered the jury in the O.J. Simpson murder
case.319 The jurors' expensive sequestration contributed to the trial’s $9,000,000 price tag.320
Sequestration is literally "the physical isolation of a trial jury from the public."321 Either party or
the court may move to sequester the jury.322 The Supreme Court has even endorsed sequestration
as a potential cure for the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity.323 For instance, in Sheppard v.
Maxwell, the Supreme Court criticized the trial judge for not sequestering the jury from the media’s
intrusive coverage of the case.324 Sequestration relies on judicial orders and physical restrictions
to isolate the jury to prevent the media and public from prejudicially influencing their thought
process.325 Despite its effectiveness, scholars argue that the internet negates the strength of
sequestration.326
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However, there are other methods available to judges to alleviate juror bias. 327 Under Rule
21(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant can motion the court to transfer the
venue of the proceeding if there is such prejudice that prohibits a defendant from receiving a fair
and impartial trial.328 Courts will not change venue simply because a juror has been exposed to
pretrial publicity or formed a preliminary opinion regarding the case. 329 The proper inquiry is
"...whether a juror has been exposed to pretrial publicity and, if so, whether he or she can set aside
any impression or opinion resulting from that exposure and render a verdict based solely on the
evidence presented at trial."330 A prominent example of a change of venue case is Timothy
McVeigh's trial for the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. 331 The judge granted McVeigh's motion
to change the venue out of Oklahoma City, where the bombing occurred, to the District of
Colorado.332 It would have been highly unlikely for McVeigh to have had a fair trial in Oklahoma
City, after the attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building resulted in 168 deaths and hundreds
of injuries.333
Moreover, a change of venue would be futile in cases where the defendant's notoriety has
spread well beyond the local community.334 The internet renders change of venue motions all but
pointless in cases that make national or international headlines because individuals in all venues
are only one click away from harmful pretrial publicity. 335 For example, Kyle Rittenhouse's
defense team did not seek a change of venue because they knew that potential jurors all over the
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country were already familiar with the case.336 The case gained national notoriety when videos of
Rittenhouse shooting multiple victims went viral on social media.337 Both mainstream and social
media provided the case “…a constant stream of intrigue, outrage and propaganda.”338
Nonetheless, the change of venue motion is still a valuable tool to combat pretrial publicity when
a defendant's case has attracted the attention of local media, and the case's notoriety has not spread
beyond the initial community.339
Furthermore, at the request of either party, a judge may issue a continuance or
postponement to delay the trial and ward off the effects of pretrial publicity. 340 A postponement's
purpose is to delay the trial long enough for the media storm to subside. 341 A judge will only grant
a continuance when the pretrial publicity makes it impossible for a d efendant to have a fair and
impartial jury trial.342 In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Supreme Court cited continuance as a potential
remedy for prejudicial pretrial publicity.343 However, legal scholars debate whether a continuance
violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.344 Nevertheless, a continuance
allows high-profile criminal defendants an opportunity to have a trial in which the media’s
attention has subsided, allowing the high-profile defendant to have a better chance of receiving a
fair trial.345
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V.

CONCLUSION

Undeniably, there is a constitutional clash between the First and Sixth Amendments
regarding high-profile criminal cases. Individually the First and Sixth Amendments strengthen
American liberties. However, in practice, the two Amendments weaken the critical rights of a highprofile criminal defendant. Since the founding of the United States of America, this conflict has
been raging to the vexation of criminal defense attorneys in high-profile cases. The seemingly
omnipotent First Amendment overpowers the right to a fair trial provided by the Sixth.
Technological advancements in the early twenty-first century have only exacerbated the issue,
making it even more difficult for a high-profile criminal defendant to utilize his Sixth Amendment
rights. Other common-law nations censor their press and public to remedy this constitutional issue.
The American people would never tolerate such censorship. Although the American system is not
perfect, this paper finds American jury controls preferable to restricting freedom of speech and the
press. Therefore, American jury controls, coupled with actively discouraging extrajudicial
statements to promote a professional environment, give high-profile criminal defendants their best
chance at a fair trial in today's modern world.
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